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JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE CODIFICATION
OF LAW
Dean Alfange, Jr.t
I

Young Jeremy Bentham was a most precocious lad. He learned
the alphabet before he could speak; at the age of three he was discovered reading Rapin's History of England with great interest; he
began his study of Latin and Greek at the age of four, and by eight
was turning out a considerable quantity of respectable poetry in both
these languages, a habit which earned him quite a reputation in the
boarding school he entered at that age.1 In 1760, when he was twelve,
he was ready to enter Oxford, and three years later he received his
2
bachelor's degree from that institution.
Bentham's father, a prosperous attorney, had great hopes of a
successful legal career for his brilliant son, and, at his father's urging,
Jeremy, at fifteen, upon receipt of his first degree, began the study of
law. He proved particularly unsuited for a career as a practicing
lawyer, however, although for a brief period in 1767, immediately following his final departure from Oxford, he dutifully endeavored to
use his legal training professionally. But his distaste for this profession
was manifest from the outset; many years later, he declared that "I
went to the bar as the bear to the stake." 3 His first client asked him
to institute a suit to recover the sum of fifty pounds, but Bentham
advised him not to waste his money attempting to sue and sent him
away. The remainder of his cases met with roughly the same degree
of success. 4
Bentham's utter failure at the bar was not due to a lack of interest
in the law but rather to a completely negative attitude toward its practice, which was occasioned by his contempt for judges and lawyers
t Assistant Professor of Government, University of Massachusetts. A.B. 1950, Hamilton College; M.A. 1960, University of Colorado; Ph.D. 1967, Cornell University.
1 10 J. BENTEAm, THE WoRKs OF JEREmy BENTtAm 1-32 (J. Bowring ed. 1843) [here-

inafter cited as WoRKs]. Volumes 10 and 11 of the Works contain a biography of Bentham
by J. Bowring, which has been described by Leslie Stephen, not altogether undeservedly,
as "one of the worst biographies in the language." 1 L. STEPHEN, THE ENGLISH UTILrrARiANs 225 (1902). See also C.W. EVERETr, THE EDUCATION OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1-22 (1931).
2 10 WoRKs 35-45; EVERETT, supra note 1, at 27-36.
8 10 WoRKs 78.
4 Id. 51, 78; EvER=r, supra note 1, at 48-49.
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who steadfastly opposed any reform of the obsolete features of eighteenth-century English law, and who preferred, instead, to take lucrative advantage of the opportunities for exorbitant fees afforded by an
archaic legal system. His recognition of the unsatisfactory nature of
existing law had come at an early age, and, at sixteen, on hearing lectures given by William Blackstone, first Vinerian Professor of English
Law at Oxford, which were to become the basis of the famous Commentarieson the Laws of England, he was greatly repelled. His instant
dislike for Blackstone, in fact, prompted his first published work,
Fragment on Government, which appeared in 1776 and was an attack
on one part of the Introduction to the Commentaries. The Fragment
on Government was initially published anonymously, but a second
edition appeared in 1828, and in the Historical Preface to that edition
Bentham explained his reaction to his professor:
The lecturer, as any body may see, shewed the King how Majesty is God upon earth: Majesty could do no less than make him
a Judge for it. Blasphemy is-saying any thing a Judge can gratify
himself, or thinks he can recommend himself, by punishing a man
for. If tailoring a man out with God's attributes, and under that
very name, is blasphemy, none was ever so rank as Blackstone's.
The Commentaries remain unprosecuted; the poison still injected
into all eyes: piety is never offended by it: it may be perhaps,
should piety in high places ever cease to be a tool of despotism.
I, too, heard the lectures; age, sixteen; and even then, no
small part of them with rebel ears. The attributes,I remember, in
particular, stuck in my stomach. No such audacity, however, as
that of publishing my rebellion, was at that time in my thoughts.5
Bentham's aversion toward the Commentaries, and toward the
lectures from which that work was drawn, arose largely from the
rapturous praise with which Blackstone depicted English law and from
Blackstone's almost total unwillingness to notice any defect in the
English legal system. When, in the concluding passage of the Commentaries, Blackstone admitted the existence of certain faults in the
law, he surrounded this admission with paeans of adulation, as if to
emphasize the minor and easily forgivable nature of these defects. It
was this concluding passage that best expressed the tone of the work
which served to infuriate Bentham:
Of a constitution, so wisely contrived, so strongly raised, and so
highly finished, it is hard to speak with that praise, which is justly
and severely its due:-the thorough and attentive contemplation
5 Bentham, Preface to J. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMNENT, in 1 WoRKS at 249
(Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis in quotations appears in the source.)

CORNELL LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 55:58

_of it will furnish its best panegyric. It hath been the endeavour
of these commentaries, however the execution may have succeeded,
to examine its solid foundations, to mark out its extensive plan,
to explain the use and distribution of its parts, and from the harmonious concurrence of those several parts, to demonstrate the
elegant proportion of the whole. We have taken occasion to admire at every turn the noble monuments of ancient simplicity,
and the more curious refinements of modern art. Nor have its
faults been concealed from view; for faults it has, lest we should
be tempted to think it of more than human structure; defects,
chiefly arising from the decays of time, or the rage of unskilful
improvements in later ages. To sustain, to repair, to beautify this
noble pile, is a charge intrusted principally to the nobility, and
such gentlemen of the kingdom, as are delegated by their country
to parliament. The protection of THE LIBERTY OF BRITAIN
is a duty which they owe to themselves, who enjoy it; to their ancestors, who transmitted it down; and to their posterity, who will
claim at their hands this, the best birthright, and noblest inheritance of mankind. 6
Yet the eighteenth century was not the appropriate time for lavish
praise of English law. As Professor R. H. Graveson has noted, "The
eighteenth century is notably conspicuous for its almost complete lack
of legal reform and legal development. ' 7 Satisfaction with the law
had led to its stagnation, and as society changed through the course of
the century the law simply failed to keep pace. The general optimism
and complacency which pervaded England in the years following the
constitutional settlement of 1689, together with a system of parliamentary representation based on rotten boroughs and, at the end of the
century, revulsion with the excesses of the Jacobins, had effectively
obstructed any systematic reform of the law, particularly since the
ruling classes maintained a vested interest in the preservation of the
existing legal rules. As Sir Roland K. Wilson has observed:
During the first forty years of the reign of George III it would be
hard to point out a single statute, within the domain of private
law, which with our present lights we can unhesitatingly set down
as an improvement; very few indeed of which it can be said that
they were even honestly intended by their authors to promote the
well-being of the people at large as distinguished from the immediate interest of the Government of the day, or, at most, of the
limited class which alone had an appreciable share of political
8
power.
6 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 442-43 (8th ed. 1778).
7 Graveson, The Restless Spirit of English Law, in JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE LAiv
101-02 (G. Keeton & G. Schwarzenberger eds. 1948).
8 R. WILSON, HISTORY OF MODERN ENGLISH LAW 157 (1875). This work contains a careful and detailed description of the status of English law in the 18th century. Id. at 1-132.
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In eighteenth-century England, criminal law did not extend to
cover many antisocial acts; yet capital punishment was required for
relatively trivial offenses. Law taxes placed undue burdens on litigants;
extremely complicated rules of procedure delayed decisions and made
justice costly; and obsolete rules of evidence made informed judgments
far more difficult. Moreover, throughout the century a constantly increasing demand was placed on the courts to deal with cases that did
not fit within the archaic categories established by the existing law.
These new and complex cases were dealt with by the expedient of
forcing them into the old categories through the use of elaborate and
cumbersome legal fictions. These fictions were both "noxious" and
"useless," as they have been described by one of Blackstone's successors
in the Vinerian Chair at Oxford, 9 and the asinine complacency which
sustained them thrived on Blackstone's adulatory phrases, even though
a legal system built on such fictions could hardly be other than chaotic.
It was in recognition of this acute state of disorder that Jeremy
Bentham chose to devote his life to the cause of law reform. He was
dedicated to the belief that justice, order, certainty, and simple procedure could be implanted permanently into any legal system through
the adoption of a comprehensive but concise legal code. However, he
realized that it was necessary to shatter the smug satisfaction with
which English law was then Viewed before a demand could be created
for the adoption of such a code. Consequently, he took for himself the
role of censor rather than expositor of the law and undertook to observe what the law "ought to be" rather than merely to observe what
it is. 10 As he wrote:
From the view of these abominations resulted a passionate desire
of seeing them cleared away. It soon appeared that to cleanse the
Augean stables to any purpose there was no other way than to
pour in a body of severe and steady criticism and to spread it over
the whole extent of the subject in one comprehensive unbroken
tide. This I determined to attempt: and whatever might be the
success, it seemed that the labor of a life, as of a thousand more
if I had them would not be ill-bestowed in the endeavor. 11
II

In 1768 Jeremy Bentham, then twenty years old, read Joseph
Priestley's Essay on Government, and there he found a mention of the
9 A.V. DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND 91 (1905).

10 Bentham, supra note 5, at 229.
11 Unpublished manuscript, quoted in C.W. Everett, Introduction to J. BENTiAM,
T-z Lmnr

or JumsPRuDENcE DEFIn&D

4 (1945).
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concept of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Bentham
reports that upon seeing those words he exclaimed "Eureka," for, like
Archimedes, he had made a monumental discovery.12 Helvetius's De
l'Esprit also had a profound effect on Bentham when he read it shortly
after his experience with Priestley's work. Bowring relates that upon
reading Helvetius, Bentham began to consider seriously his future
career:
"Have I a genius for anything? What can I produce? That was the
first inquiry he [Bentham] made of himself. Then came another:
"What of all earthly pursuits is the most important?" Legislation,
was the answer Helvetius gave. "Have I a genius for legislation?"
Again and again was the question put to himself. He turned it
over in his thoughts: he sought every symptom he could discover
in his natural disposition or acquired habits. "And have I indeed
a genius for legislation? I gave myself the answer, fearfully and
tremblingly-Yes!"13
Bentham was to live for sixty-four years after his exposure to
Priestley and Helvetius in 1768, and in those years he was to strive to
advance by his multitudinous writings the principle of utility-the
principle by which actions are judged according to the likelihood of
their bringing about "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
"happiness" being defined as the maximization of pleasure and the
minimization of pain. This principle served him as a standard by
which legislation and legal rules could be judged. Did a rule of law,
either substantive or procedural, operate to bring about the greatest
happiness of the greatest number? If so, it was a wise rule; if not, it
was indefensible, and it was the task of the legislature to replace it
immediately with a new rule which met the requirements of this
principle.
His most important work, Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation, published in 1789, begins with his most famous words
in defense of the principle of utility:
12 Bowring, History of the Greatest-HappinessPrinciple, in I J. BENTHAm, DEONTOLoGy 00 (1834). The phrase was, of course, not original with Priestley. Bentham himself
had encountered it earlier, for he had read Beccaria's Dei delitti e delle pene in the
original Italian soon after it appeared in 1764, and Beccaria had used it. EvRr-r, supra
note 1, at 47. Moreover, as early as 1725 Francis Hutcheson had stated, in his Enquiry
ConcerningMoral Good and Evil, that "that action is best which secures the greatest hap.
piness of the greatest number." See 1 STEPHEN, supra note 1, at 178 n.3. And Helvetius in
1758, in De l'Esprit,had declared that the greatest happiness for the greatest number was
the proper basis for legislation. See E. HALtVY, THE GRO-W OF PHILOSoPHIc RADIcALISM
20-21 (M. Morris transl. 1952).
13 10 Woaxs 27.
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Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out
what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.
On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other
the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They
govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their
empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.
The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it
for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear
the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.14
Each individual naturally follows the course of action that will
maximize his own pleasure and minimize his own pain-and thereby
insures the greatest possible happiness for himself. There is, of course,
no assurance that the sum of these selfish actions will automatically
total "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," since an act
which may bring its initiator a small amount of pleasure could conceivably spread misery and, therefore, pain among large numbers. The
"fabric of felicity," Bentham realized, would have to be reared "by
the hands of reason and of law." Reason would be used to acquaint
men with the principle of utility and to persuade them that it would
ultimately be in their interest to act in accordance with the dictates
of that principle. Law would be used to coerce those who remained
recalcitrant, by offsetting the personal pleasure that might be obtainable from an act contrary to the principle of utility through the imposition of pain in the form of punishment.
However, if the purpose of law was to be the furtherance of the
principle of utility, it was essential that each individual law be designed
in strict accordance with that principle. How this could be done
Bentham, with his "genius for legislation," sought to demonstrate.
Above all, he was convinced that since legislation was a science, laws
should be drawn up by scientists like himself, who understood the
principle of utility and who could determine what laws would do most
to provide the greatest happiness of the greatest number. There could
be no room for haphazard legal development. Laws drawn up by
scientists would be placed in the form of a code, and nothing that did
not appear in the code would be law. This would, of course, exclude
all judge-made law, and at this point Bentham's theory came into direct conflict with the traditions of the English common law.
14 J. BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, in
WoRKs 1.

I
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According to Bentham, there were four principal objects of civil
law, which were subordinate only to the principle of utility; these
were subsistence, abundance, equality, and security.15 Of these, by far
the most important was the principle of security. Law can do nothing
directly to serve the aim of subsistence; the pleasure of enjoyment and
the pain of want provide the motives for men to obtain subsistence
for themselves, and there is no need for the sanction of law to augment
the physical sanctions already present. 6 Similarly, no laws are necessary
to coerce men to seek abundance to serve as a protection against
famines, wars, and accidents; the pleasure of enjoyment is again
enough.' However, if men do not require the sanction of law in order
to seek to obtain for themselves subsistence and abundance, they do
require the sanction of law to insure that they will be free to enjoy the
materials of subsistence and abundance for which they have labored.
This is the principle of security, and Bentham declares that the law
must be especially concerned with the attainment of this object:
The Law does not say to a man, "Work and I will reward
you;" but it says to him, "Work, and by stopping the hand that
would take them from you, I will ensure to you the fruits of your
labour, its natural and sufficient reward, which, without me, you
could not preserve." If industry creates, it is the law which preserves: if, at the first moment, we owe every thing to labour, at the

second, and every succeeding moment, we owe every thing to the

law.' 8

The principle of security, therefore, has been termed the "disappointment preventing principle."'19 Life is based on a series of expectations and hopes--"it is by means of this that the successive moments which compose the duration of life are not like insulated and
independent points, but become parts of a continuous whole." 2 "The
principle of security comprehends the maintenance of all these
hopes;" 21 therefore, the chief purpose of law is to guard against their
disturbance, for the disappointment of settled expectations produces a
particularly intense pain. So important is the principle of security that
the fourth object of law, the principle of equality, must always yield
before it. Bentham states this unequivocally:
15

J.

BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVM CODE, in 1 WoRKs 302.

16 Id. at 303.
17 Id. at 304.
18 Id. at 308.
19

HAL VY, supra note 12, at 46.

20 1 WoRKs 808.
21 Id.
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When security and equality are in. opposition, there should be
no hesitation: equality should give way. The first is the foundation
of life-of subsistence-of abundance-of happiness; every thing
depends on it. Equality only produces a certain portion of happiness: besides, though it may be created, it will always be imperfect; if it could exist for a day, the revolutions of the next day
would disturb it. The establishment of equality is a chimera: the
only thing which can be done is to diminish inequality. 22
Although Bentham believed that the law could work toward the elimination of inequality, he stipulated that this process could only be
undertaken gradually, so that nothing be done to unsettle immediate
expectations. He declared that the law might do this by intervening
in the distribution of estates to prevent unnecessarily large inheritances
and by removing artificial barriers to equality, such as state-maintained
monopolies and entails.2 3 His principle of equality, therefore, referred
not to an equality of status or wealth, but only to an equality of
24
opportunity.
Since the single most important object of law is the protection
of individual expectations, it is imperative that all law exhibit two
characteristics-cognoscibility and accessibility.25 Unless the law were
cognoscible, that is, in a form in which it could be understood by
everyone, and accessible, that is, readily available to everyone, no one
except a small coterie of judges and lawyers would be justified in
maintaining any expectations at all, for only this small group would
be able to know whether the law would support their expectations. To
obtain cognoscibility and accessibility in the law, Bentham constantly
insisted upon the necessity of codification. Judge-made law, he asserted,
was "dog-law":
Scarce any man has the means of knowing a twentieth part
of the laws he is bound by. Both sorts of law are kept most happily and carefully from the knowledge of the people: statute law
by its shape and bulk; common law by its very essence. It is the
judges (as we have seen) that make the common law. Do you know
how they make it? Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When
your dog does anything you want to break him of, you wait till
he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you make laws
for your dog: and this is the way the judges make law for you and
me. They won't tell a man beforehand what it is he should not do
-they won't so much as allow of his being told: they lie by till he
22 Id. at 311.
23 Id. at 312-13.

24 See F.C. Montague, Introduction to J. BENTHAM, FRAGMENT ON GOVERNhdENT 41
(1891).
25 See J. STONE, TaE PRoviNcE AmD FUNCION OF LAw 287-88 (1946).
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has done something which they say he should not have done, and
then they hang him for it. What way, then, has any man of coming
at this dog-law? Only by watching their proceedings: by observing
in what cases they have hanged a man, in what cases they have
sent him to jail, in what cases they have seized his goods, and so
forth. These proceedings they won't publish themselves, and if
anybody else publishes them, it is what they call a contempt of
court, and a man may be sent to jail for it.26
This attack was leveled at William Henry Ashhurst, a puisne
judge of the Court of King's Bench, who in 1792 delivered a wellpublicized charge to a Middlesex grand jury, in which he condemned
the French Revolution, and, by comparison, heaped exorbitant praise
on English government and English law. The title of the brief tract
containing Bentham's attack was Truth v. Ashhurst, a particularly
vicious title for a work criticizing a judge. Bentham's chief adversary
in the area of the common law; however, was hardly Ashhurst, but
was, instead, Blackstone. In the Commentaries, Blackstone had spoken
of common law and statute law together as making up the rules "prescribed to the inhabitants of this kingdom.' '2 7 Bentham replied to
28
in the pungent and vivathis in his Comment on the Commentaries
his
early
writings:
cious style that characterized
As to Common Law, where is it prescribed? What is there in it to
prescribe? Who made it? Who expressed it? Of whom is it the
Will? Questions all these to which he should have had an answer
ready before he spoke of Common Law as real Law, ... and...
as being a Law prescribed. 29
With regard to accessibility, Blackstone unhappily stated that the
manner in which the law was "notified" to the citizens was a "matter
of very great indifference." However, he quickly stated that the law
might be notified by proclamation, or "by universal tradition and long
26 J. BENTHAM, TRUTH v. AsHHURsT, in 5 WORKS 235. It should be noted that Ben-

tham's remarks regarding the inability of reporters to publish judicial decisions was less
than fair. Up to the middle of the 18th century, the permission of the judges was usually
obtained before reports were made public, but after that time reporters no longer sought
formal permission, although judicial pressure was sometimes employed to cause a case to
be omitted from the published reports. See 12 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 110-13 (1938).
27 1 BLACKSrONE, supra note 6, at 63.
28 Comment on the Commentaries,written in 1775, is a more general attack on Blackstone than the Fragment on Government. Bentham did not bother to have it published,
and it was not brought to light until 1928, when it was discovered by Charles Warren
Everett in the course of a comprehensive inspection of Bentham's manuscripts at University College, London. A great deal of the Comment on the Commentaries was taken
up with Bentham's rebuttal of the views expressed by Blackstone on the common law.
29 J. BmTHAm, CoMnIMNr ON TIm CommmNTAREs 65 (1928).
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practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the case of the
common law of England," and ought to be notified "in the most public
and perspicuous manner; not like Caligula who (according to Dio
Cassius) wrote his laws in a very small character, and hung them upon
high pillars, the more effectually to ensnare the people."' 0
Bentham found this totally unsatisfactory:
This Common Law of England then is "notified" sufficiently,
the "tradition" of it is as "universal" as he would wish it. If he
means this, one may believe him. In the meantime, who is there
that knows it? nobody but a few Lawyers. It is well if they do.
But whether it is made known in any more effective manner, is
to him "matter of great indifference." This may be: tho to a Lawyer it is charity to suppose it: but to the people, that it is not
better notified is a "matter of great" and well-merited complaint ....
... He tells us of Caligula the Roman Tyrant, who "hung
up" his Laws "in a small character" (but who hung them upremember this ye Legislators and ye hoarders-up of unpublished
judgments-but he hung them up) 3 1
In his General View of a Complete Code of Laws, Bentham summarized his arguments against judge-made law, which, he stated, must
always be ex post facto in that it is made by judges to apply to particular cases after they have arisen, and he explained why members
of the legal profession maintained their high regard for this type of
law:
The grand utility of the law is certainty: unwritten law does
not-it cannot-possess this quality; the citizen can find no part
of it, cannot take it for his guide; he is reduced to consultations
-he assembles the lawyers-he collects as many opinions as his
fortune will permit; and all this ruinous procedure often serves
only to create new doubts.
Nothing but the greatest integrity in a tribunal can prevent
the judges from making an unwritten law a continual instrument
of favour and corruption.
But wherever it exists, lawyers will be its defenders, and, perhaps innocently, its admirers. They love the source of their power,
of their reputation, of their fortune: they love unwritten law for
the same reason that the Egyptian priest loved hieroglyphics, for
the same reason that the priests of all religions have loved their
peculiar dogmas and mysteries.3 2
Bentham's contempt for the practicing lawyer knew almost no
80 1 BLAtc
31 BENTHAm,

rONE, supra note 6, at 45-46.

supra note 29, at 68-69.

82 3 Wopus 206.
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bounds, He spoke of the going concern of "Judge & Co.," whose thriving business consisted of relieving litigants of as much money as
possible through court and attorneys' fees. It was in the interest of
"Judge & Co." to make the law as confusing as possible, to delay the
administration of justice, and to establish large numbers of technical
barriers to final judgments."
To lessen the power of the grasping breed who made up "Judge 9C
Co.," to add certainty-"the grand utility of the law"-to the legal system by promoting the cognoscibility and accessibility of legal rules,
and thereby to advance the principle of security by preventing the
disappointment of settled expectations, Bentham insisted on the necessity of a code of laws. But in the formulation of this code the sole
criterion to be considered was to be the principle of utility. Therefore,
all other possible criteria which in themselves might allow the establishment of law would have to be rejected. Among these other criteria the most prominent was that of natural rights, and Bentham did
not hesitate in attacking it. The concept of natural rights, he declared,
was "nonsense upon stilts." 34 A right should be looked upon as imprescriptible only if granting it that status would provide for the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. However, if that were the
case the right would be protected solely because it accorded with the
principle of utility, and not because it could be looked upon as inalienable on the basis of some other standard.
In 1791, Bentham wrote an essay entitled Anarchical Fallacies,
which was prudently allowed to go unpublished until 1816. This was
a critical analysis of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, in
which Bentham vigorously exposed the logical weaknesses inherent in
a theory of natural rights. Taking each article of the Declaration in
turn, Bentham pointed to the errors and ambiguities it contained.
Article I of the Declaration began: "Men are born and remain free,
and equal in respect of rights." Bentham's reply: "Absurd and miserable nonsensel When the great complaint ...

is-that so many men

slaves."'3 5

are born
Moreover, with respect to equality of rights,
Bentham sarcastically added: "The apprentice, then, is equal in rights
to his master."' 6 Perhaps, he conceded, the authors of the Declaration
intended to abolish all master-servant relationships, but such a prospect
was so contrary to the principle of utility that he could not refrain
from attacking it. What a declaration that liberty was incompatible
with servitude actually meant, he asserted, was: "Better a man should
in 7 WoRuS 226-311.
J. BNwT.Am, ANARCmCAL FALLACIS, in 2 WoaxS 501.
35 Id. at 498.
86 Id.
33 See J. BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE,
34
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starve than hire himself;-better half the species starve, than hire itself
''
out to service.
A theory of natural rights necessarily implies the existence of
rights granted by a source outside the state and completely independent of it. Bentham rejected such a concept categorically. Natural
rights was to him an anarchical doctrine, for it invited disregard and
disobedience of positive law, and as such was entirely contradictory to
the principle of utility. The grand utility of the law was certainty and
the prevention of disappointment, but if one could declare that existing positive law was void because it conflicted with natural law and
could, therefore, violate positive law with impunity, certainty and security would vanish, leading inevitably to the very widespread dissemination of pain. Nor could natural rights be called into play if
existing law was contrary to the principle of utility; the remedy for
such a situation was new legislation, not an appeal to nebulous rights
outside of government. Bentham declared:
In proportion to the want of happiness resulting from the
want of rights, a reason exists for wishing that there were such
things as rights. But reasons for wishing there were such things
as rights, are not rights;-a reason for wishing that a certain right
were established, is not the right-want is not supply--hunger is
not bread.3 8
"7

The crisis of the French Revolution provides an interesting commentary on Bentham's driving passion for law reform. He was little
interested in the cause of the revolution, or in political reform, as
such. 9 However, he quickly saw in the French Revolution an exceptional opportunity to advance the cause of utilitarianism. Allowing
his attack on the Declaration of the Rights of Man to remain unpublished, he instead dispatched to the States General two essays on parliamentary procedure and judicial reorganization, and also offered to
the French his plan for a "Panopticon," a humane prison based entirely on utilitarian principles. He even indicated his willingness to go
to France, if the "Panopticon" plan were adopted, in order to become
"gratuitously the gaoler thereof."40
37

Id. at 499.

8

Id. at 501.

He was originally quite diffident regarding forms of government; in Great Britain,
his espousal of the cause of parliamentary reform came only after he was convinced that
the aristocracy, to protect their own interests, were unalterably opposed to utilitarian legislative reform, and after he found that his most devoted adherents were democrats. HAL-9vy,
supra note 12, at 251-59.
40 1 STEPHEN, supra note 1, at 197. Stephen comments that Bentham's "proposal to
become a gaoler during the revolution reaches the pathetic by its amiable innocence."
39
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Bentham's writings, of course, had no effect whatever on the
National Assembly, although that body subsequently conferred upon
him the honorary title of citizen. 41 However, his effort was typical of
his constant endeavor to secure the adoption, in some nation, of his
codification proposals. Ironically, although the bulk of his attack on
existing law was directed at the English legal system, England was the
least likely of any of the nations of Europe to adopt a code. The English were exceedingly proud of their liberty, particularly in view of
the conspicuous lack of liberty extant elsewhere in eighteenth-century
Europe, and were willing to attribute to the common law a large share
of the reason for their freedom.4 On the other hand, the continent
appeared to be very fertile ground for the development of legal
codes and, as utilitarianism was politically neutral, Bentham strove
to impress upon the monarchs of Europe the wisdom of adherence
to the principle of utility in their formulation. He was especially
43
anxious to gain the attention and approval of Catherine of Russia,
but, as Professor Halvy has stated, his one overpowering desire was
"to secure the drawing up and the promulgation of his entire Code,
44
everywhere, somewhere, no matter where."
III
A legal code being an indispensable requirement of the principle of utility, it was, of course, essential that Bentham consider
the content of such a code and the criteria to be employed in order
to insure that every provision of the code would be in strict conformity with utility. To this problem Bentham addressed himself at
great length, and a great deal of his writing was devoted to explicating the principles underlying the formulation of the perfect utilitarian code.
It was, first of all, to be assumed that all law would be contained
within the covers of the volume containing the code. Nothing that
was not explicitly stated in the code was to be permitted to have
HAUvY, supra note 12, at 173.
42 DicaY, supra note 9, at 146.
43 In
1779, when his brother Samuel traveled to Russia, Bentham hoped that he
could put his proposals before the Empress. In a letter to his brother, written in French,
Bentham called upon him to do everything he could to win Catherine over. He wrote, in
part: "Plut6t que de la manquer, tu la guetteras dans les rues, tu te prosterneras devant
elle, et, apr~s avoir mang6 autant de poussi~re que tu as envie, tu lui jetteras mon billet
41

au nez, on bien a la gorge, si elle veut bien que tes mains soient a:' quoted in Everett,
supra note 11, at 10.
44 HALvY, supra note 12, at 149.
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the force of law. This was entirely in accordance with the necessity
for the cognoscibility and accessibility of all law which he stressed,
for, if the code could be supplemented by judge-made law as the
need arose, its certainty would be correspondingly diminished. Bentham conceded that cases would arise for which no clear statement
of the law could be found in the code. However, even here the
judge was not to be permitted to interpret the law and arrive at
a decision. Instead, if the code were obscure on a subject of controversy, it was to be up to the judge to refer the matter to the legislature for solution.
The only power of interpretation left to the judge would be
in cases in which the will of the legislature was clear, but in which
it had "failed to express [its will], either through haste or inaccuracy
of language." 45 Thus the task of the judge was to be largely mechanical or clerical. He was to occupy a very minor position in the government, but his workload could be expected to be quite small since
the code would be available and clear to all men, who would, therefore, settle their disputes on the basis of its provisions without resorting to futile litigation. Moreover, the clarity of the law made it
entirely unnecessary for judges to have had legal training; consequently, to guard against the reactivation of "Judge & Co." and to
insure that judges and lawyers would not conspire to increase fees
by the introduction of false obscurity or unnecessary delay into the
legal system, Bentham would have barred lawyers from serving as
judges. 46
Needless to say, the style and language of the code was, for
Bentham, a matter of prime importance-the clarity and precision on
which he insisted was not to be obtained by careless drafting. With
regard to precision, each provision of the code was to be worded in
such a way as to convey one and only one idea. A statute prohibiting
murder, for example, should not provide punishment for "whosoever
draws blood," for, if it did, a surgeon would be liable to punishment
under it, while a murderer who did not draw the blood of his victim
would not.47 With regard to style, brevity was the most important
factor, and was to apply to both sentences and paragraphs. Commenting that "[i]n the English statutes, sentences may be found which
would make a small volume," Bentham argued for shorter sentences
to provide greater rest for the mind of the reader and greater ease of
45 J. BanNTm', GENERAL VIEW OF A COMi.LETE CODE OF LAws, in 3 WoRKS 210.

46 J.BENTHAM, CON s-tioNAL CODE, in 9 WoRxs 592.
47 BENmTA,
supra note 45, at 207.
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understanding. 48 He also offered four positive stylistic rules to be observed by the legislator drafting the code: (1) Avoid all technical or
legal terms wherever possible; (2) if technical terms must be used, define them carefully in the body of the law; (3) define technical terms
in "common and known words"; and (4) if the same idea is to be expressed more than once, express it in exactly the same words. 49 If these
rules were observed, Bentham felt certain that
A code formed upon these principles would not require schools
for its explanation, would not require casuists to unravel its subtilties. It would speak a language familiar to everybody: each one
might consult it at his need. It would be distinguished from all
other books by its greater simplicity and clearness. The father of
a family, without assistance, might take it in his hand and teach
it to his children, and give to the precepts of private morality the
force and dignity of public morals.5 0
If solidly grounded on the principle of utility, the code, once
formulated, would express the law in terms that would rarely need
to be amended. Such amendments as would take place from time to
time would only infrequently be of a substantive nature and would
largely be concerned with points of obscurity or stylistic deficiencies.
General amendments would only have to be considered once in each
century:
[O]nce in a hundred years, let the laws be revised for the sake of
changing such terms and expressions as by that time may have
become obsolete-remembering that this will be more needful in
regard to the language of the legal formularies in use, than that'
of the text of the laws themselves. 51
Bentham, however, did not claim that observance of the principle of utility would yield eternal verities, or that a code suitable
for one country at one time would be suitable for all countries at
all times. In this regard he was influenced by the thinking of Montesquieu, and he acknowledged this in his essay on the Influence of
Time and Place in Matters of Legislation:
Before Montesquieu, a man who had a distant country given him
to make laws for, would have made short work of it. "Name to me
the people," he would have said; "reach me down my Bible, and
the business is done at once. The laws they have been used to, no
matter what they are, mine shall supersede them: manners, they
shall have mine, which are the best in nature; religion, they shall
48 Id. at

208.

49 Id. at 209.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 210.
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have mine too, which is all of it true, and the only one that is so."
Since Montesquieu, the number of documents which a legislator
would require is considerably enlarged. "Send the people," he will
say, "to me, or me to the people; lay open to me the whole tenor
of their life and conversation; paint to me the face and geography
of the country; give me as close and minute a view as possible of
their present laws, their manners, and their religion."52
Nevertheless, Bentham by no means accepted Montesquieu wholeheartedly. Climatic conditions, which were of such predominant
importance for Montesquieu, were relegated to a subordinate position by Bentham, 53 and he declared that alterations in the ideal code
to meet local conditions need be only slight.5 4 Above all, the code
should be drawn up to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, and
Bentham refused to concede that "different countries [had] different
catalogues of pleasures and of pains," for, he stated, "human nature
may be pronounced to be every where the same."55 What might
differ from country to country was the type of action that might
induce pleasure or pain, and Bentham provided several examples
of situations in which special laws might be needed in particular
nations or regions to take account of climatic or topographical peculiarities, 6 but the changes he allowed for in his examples were largely
trivial. As Sir William Holdsworth observed, "[h]is real belief is that
laws grounded on the true principle of utility are suited to all times
and places. He 'reaches down' the principle of utility, and uses it
in much the same way as a man, before Montesquieu, used his
Bible. '57 It was because of this that he felt himself competent to draw
up a code that could be put into practice "everywhere, somewhere,
no matter where."
IV
The culminating work of Bentham's life was the unfinished Constitutional Code, to which he turned in earnest about 1820, and on
which he continued to work until his death in 1832. A primary
impetus for the creation of the Code was the request of his followers
52 J. BENTmAmt, INFLUIENcE oF Tmim

AND PLAc

173 n.$.
53 See HALtVY, supra note 12, at 67-68.
54 13 HorvSWO -H, supra note 26, at 76-78.
55 BENTHAm, supra note 52, at 172.
56 See, e.g., id. at 175.
57 13 HOLDSWORTH, supranote 26, at 77.
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in Spain and Portugal who hoped to secure its adoption there, but,
of course, as Professor Hal~vy noted, the Constitutional Code "was
addressed not only to the two States of the Iberian peninsula, but
to all the nations of the earth."5 8 The Code has been described by
Charles Warren Everett as Bentham's "greatest work," 59 and it demonstrates, as Professor Everett puts it, that "Bentham's government is
a positive government, not a negative one. It touches man at all
points from the cradle to the grave." 60 The nature of this work, in
fact, raises serious questions as to the validity of the traditional view
of Bentham as a committed advocate of laissez faire.
To be sure, Bentham in his earlier works (prior to 1810) espoused the doctrine of laissez faire, and treated it essentially as the
natural outcome of observing the principle of utility. In the Defence
of Usury,61 written in 1787, he mounted a classic attack on laws restricting the lending of money at interest and in 1793, in A Manual
of PoliticalEconomy, he was able to write:
With few exceptions, and those not very considerable ones,
the attainment of the maximum of enjoyment will be most effectually secured by leaving each individual to pursue his own maximum of enjoyment, in proportion as he is in possession of the
means. 62
He opposed excessive-in the sense of unnecessary-legislation of
all varieties, declaring, "[e]very law is an evil, for every law is an
infraction of liberty." 63 Since legislation involved the imposition of
evil on society, it could only be justified as a means of reducing or
eliminating other evils of greater magnitude. And because examples of noxious and useless restraints abounded in English law, he
condemned them with vigor and acerbity. In an acid passage in Truth
v. Ashhurst, in 1792, he wrote:
I sow corn: partridges eat it, and if I attempt to defend it
against the partridges, I am fined or sent to jail: all this, for fear
a great man, who is above sowing corn, should be in want of partridges.
The trade I was born to is overstocked: hands are wanting in
8 HALAVY, supra note 12, at 404.
59 C. W. EvERmT, JEREmY BENTHAM 82 (1966). Professor Everett there notes that this
judgment was shared by "men as different from each other as Graham Wallas and Harold
Laski." Id. An excellent summary of the Constitutional Code may be found id. at 84-109,
and excerpts id. at 232-56. The Code appears in 9.WoRKS. It comprises the entire volume.
60 EvERETr, supra note 59, at 89.
61 3 WORKS 1.
62 J. BENTHAM, A MANUAL OF PoLrTIcAL ECONOMY, in 3 WopRs 35.
63 J. BENTHAM, THEORY oF LEGISLATION 48 (2d ed. R. Hildreth transl. 1871).
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another. If I offer to work at that other, I may be sent to jail for
it. Why? Because I have not been working at it as an apprentice
for seven years. What's the consequence? That, as there is no work
for me in my original trade, I must either come upon the parish
or starve.
... At this rate, how is work ever to get done? If a man is
not poor, he won't work; and if he is poor, the laws won't let him.
How then is it that so much is done as is done? As pockets are
picked-by stealth, and because the law is so wicked that it is only
here and there that a man can be found wicked enough to think
of executing it.
Pray, Mr. Justice [Ashhurst], how is the community you speak
of the better for any of these restraints? and where is the necessity
of them? and how is safety strengthened or good order benefited
by them?6 4
These attacks upon the archaic restrictions upon individual liberty
in the common law comported well with the basic tenets of laissezfaire ideology that was dominant in the nineteenth century, and in
that age of liberalism Bentham was acclaimed, and the influence of
his thinking widespread. Reforms, however, that were originally intended as a means of enhancing liberty by the removal of legal
restraints often ended as expansions of governmental power. 65
There is no reason to believe that the separation of laissez
faire and utility was a source of concern to Bentham. His interest
was wholly in the latter, and he supported laissez faire in his early
work because he firmly believed it to be the policy most congenial
to the principle of utility. But the greatest happiness of the greatest
supra note 26, at 234.
65 The irony of this was well noted by A. V. Dicey:
The guides of English legislation during the era of individualism, by whatever party name they were known, accepted the fundamental ideas of Benthamism. The ultimate end, therefore, of these men was to promote legislation in
accordance with the principle of utility; but their immediate and practical object
was the extension of individual liberty as the proper means for ensuring the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. Their policy, however, was at every
turn thwarted by the opposition or inertness of classes biassed by some sinister
interest. Hence sincere believers in laissez faire found that for the attainment of
their ends the improvement and the strengthening of governmental machinery
was an absolute necessity. In this work they were seconded by practical men who,
though utterly indifferent to any political theory, saw the need of administrative
changes suited to meet the multifarious and complex requirements of a modern
and industrial community. The formation of an effective police force for London
(1829)-the rigorous and scientific administration of the Poor Law (1834) under
the control of the central government-the creation of authorities for the enforcement of laws to promote the public health and the increasing application of a
new system of centralisation, the invention of Bentham himself-were favoured
by Benthamites and promoted utilitarian reforms; but they were measures which
in fact limited the area of individual freedom.
Dicn,, supra note 9, at 305-06.
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number meant to him just exactly that, and his superficial economic
theory was clearly subordinate to his theory of legislation. It is significant to recall Bentham's categorical rejection of the natural rights
theories upon which the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and the American Declaration of Independence, as well as much of
laissez-faire economics, were grounded. For, if there can be no natural rights, then liberty cannot be among them, and it may be swept
aside by legislation when utility demands. Utilitarianism and laissez
faire were tentatively united by circumstance, not logical necessity,
and, although the march of individualism "from status to contract,"
in Maine's phrase, took place in the nineteenth century behind the
banner of utilitarianism, Bentham's doctrine of scientific legislation
was ultimately influential in the discrediting of the economic theory
with which it has been commonly associated. For, when the point
was reached that the gross inequalities and acute poverty resulting
from the unregulated industrial economic system came to be generally recognized, the requirement of the principle of utility that law
achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number obviously
called for drastic restrictions on individual liberty to alleviate the
plight of the majority.
V
Law reform was Bentham's aim, and the success of Bentham and
his followers in bringing about reform is nothing short of remarkable. As early as 1843, in the advertisement to his introduction to
Bowring's edition of Bentham's works, John Hill Burton was able
to list some twenty-six reforms in the law that were traceable to
Bentham's arguments for their adoption and to count some ten others
that had acquired substantial support 6 In 1875, after more comprehensive legal reform had taken place, Sir Henry Maine declared, "I
do not know a single law-reform effected since Bentham's day which
cannot be traced to his influence." 67 Of the Constitutional Code,
which he described as "the mine from which a whole new system
of English Government and of the relation between English central
and local government was extracted in the years that followed the
Reform Bill of 1832,"68 Graham Wallas wrote:
60 See Advertisement, in 1 WoR~s 3 n.0.
67 H. MAiNE, EAR.Ly HxsroRr op INSTITUTIoNs 397 (1875).
68 Wallas, Jeremy Bentham, 38 PoL. Sci. Q. 45, 54 (1923).
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The whole book was at last printed in 1841, and contained, mixed
with some details which seem to us fanciful, schemes which have
since then been carried out for a logical division of work between
the government departments, for Ministries of Health, and Education, and Police, and Transport, in connection with corresponding
municipal committees and expert municipal officials, and-most
wonderful of all when one thinks of the patronage arrangements
of the time-a Civil Service recruited by competitive examination,
access to which was to be made possible to the poorest boy of talent
by a great system of educational scholarships. 69
Perhaps the single change that would have pleased Bentham the
most, however, is the codification (the word, it should be noted, was
even coined by him70 ) that has been effected since his day in various
71
segments of English law.
69 Id.

70 See C. K. ALLEN, The Young Bentham, in LEAL DurimS 135 (1931).
71 See 13 I-IornsWoarw, supra note 26, at 134.

